Case Quotes on the Importance of Training and Experience

Beyond the evidence code, the courts have continually and consistently recognized the importance of an officer’s expertise from his or her training and experience.  This can be illustrated by the following quotes…

United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2010),

[T]he district court appropriately gave strong weight to Trooper Bowles's experience and training: "Trooper Bowles was allowed to make reasonable judgments based on his experience in drug enforcement to assess the circumstances he encountered at the time.” 

United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997),

"[D]eference is to be accorded a law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions."

United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2010),

 “[W]e accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. Wood, 106 F.3d at 946; see also United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1484 (10th Cir. 1994) (observing that deference is owed to police officer's ability to assess suspiciousness of seemingly innocent conduct). Thus, "[t]he evaluation is made from the perspective of the reasonable officer, not the reasonable person." United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).”

United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2011), 

“[W]e accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1146 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).” 

United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2011),

“United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002) (quotations omitted). "This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person." Id.” 

United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d. 1120 (10th Cir. 2005),

“[W]e bear in mind that the officer (and not the court) was present at the encounter, and the officer (and not the court) has the training and experience to evaluate and compare the reactions of motorists to questioning. We therefore give Trooper Peech's assessment the "due weight" to which it is entitled under the Supreme Court's precedents.” 

“The government properly reminds us that officers often possess expertise permitting them to understand the criminal connotations associated with facts that may seem innocent to the untrained. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273.”

United States v. Powell, 277 Fed. Appx. 782, 784-788, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10096, *5-16 (10th Cir. Kan. 2008),

“ . . .granting deference to a trained officer's ‘ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious circumstances.’"

United States v. Ka Kay Ma, 254 Fed. Appx. 752, 754-756, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26805, *4-11 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2007),

“Moreover, courts should "defer to the ability of a trained law enforcement officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious activities." United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted).”

United States v. Hernandez-Lizardi, 530 Fed. Appx. 676, 680-681, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15084, *8-11, 2013 WL 3802135 (10th Cir. Kan. 2013),

“Nevertheless, we defer "to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions" so long as the officer can cite "specific, articulable facts" which cannot "be outrightly dismissed as so innocent or susceptible to varying interpretations as to be innocuous."