I don’t usually like to talk about cases that have been overruled. But when it comes to informants, a little bit of history can help. Up until 1983, when a search warrant was based on information from a confidential informant, the court held that the affidavit did not meet the basic probable cause requirement unless the affidavit showed two things: (1) just how the informant knew the facts [the basis of knowledge], and (2) the informant’s veracity [track record of reliability]. This was known as the Aguilar-Spinelli Test. Then the case of Illinois v. Gates came along in 1983. The Gates case involved a warrant based on a detailed anonymous letter, but a great deal of the information was corroborated by the police. The letter and observations formed the probable cause for a search warrant for the Gates’ residence. In upholding the warrant and supporting probable cause, the Supreme Court abandoned the two part Aguilar-Spinelli Test for the Totality of Circumstances Test.
Text from Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement."
"They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on pushers."
"I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often."
"Lance & Susan Gates"
"Greenway"
"in Condominiums"
First, the "veracity" prong was not satisfied because "[t]here was simply no basis [for] conclud[ing] that the anonymous person [who wrote the letter to the Bloomingdale Police Department] was credible."
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case …
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.
Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every situation
[T]he term 'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. . . . It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion …
We also have recognized that affidavits "are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area
courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a common sense, manner."
This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific "tests" be satisfied by every informant's tip.
Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two largely independent channels -- the informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of knowledge."
Our decisions applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work.
Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted. The letterwriter's accurate information as to the travel plans of each of the Gateses was of a character likely obtained only from the Gateses themselves, or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate information of this type a magistrate could properly conclude that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable information of the Gateses' alleged illegal activities.
For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the "two-pronged test" established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. In its place, we reaffirm the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations.
